UCTC's educational and research programs are focused on strategic planning for improving metropolitan accessibility, with emphasis on the special conditions in Region IX. Particular attent;on is directed to strategies for using transportation as an instrument of economic developmenL while also accommodating to the region's persistent expansion and while maintaining and enhancing the quahty of life there.
The Center distributes reports on its research in workin-p apers, monographs, and m reprints of published artic!es It also pubhshes Access, a magazine presenting summaries of selected studies. For a Iist of publications in prim. write to the address below.
Spurred by the changes brought by deregulation, research on airline networking behavior In a competitive environment has been ongoing et the University of California over the pest several years. The goal of this activity has been to improve our understanding of how airlines configure their networks when they are at once unconstrained and unprotected bg government reguletlon. Such an understanding Is valuable, in the short term, in guiding Infrastructure management and deployment. More fundamentally, it ts an important aspect of the larger debate surrounding the comparative virtues of regulated and unregulated transportation sgsterns.
The research has focussed on hub-end-spoke route systems. In such systems, two examples of which are shown in Figure 1 , non-stop service ts offered between a single "hub" airport and between ten and e hundred "spoke" airports. This strategy concentrates trafftc between many city = pairs on a small number of links, thereby allowing the use of larger, more economical aircraft and higher service frequencies. The hubbing airline can thus offer relatively low cost, high quallty, one-stop service in spokespa, ks markets while maintaining a very strong, usually dominant, position st 1;is hub.
Our' research has centered on these systems for e number of reasons. Most importantly, hub-and-spoke systems have proliferated tn the U.S. domestic industry since deregulation. As of lg85, approximately fifty such systems could be identified. Accompanying the development of new hub systems has been the strengthening of old ones. Operations of most major domestic airlines have, like those shown in Figure 2 , trended toward Increased concentration, e fact that ts e11 the more striking In light of the growth in the total number of their operations. Unlike most other consequences of deregulation, increased hubblng was largely unforseen.
Interest in this trend Is heightened by its impacts on the airport system and on the geographical distribution of airline service and traffic. Hubb|ng causes uneveness in the distribution of both the benefits and the costs essocieted with air transport, while et the same time closely co~pltng that distribution with the competitive fortunes of individual airlines. The net result is increased uncertainty among end rivalry between airports, as wen as the communities they serve.
The context of this research dictates en eppreach In which equilibration rather than optimization is stressed. The primary objective ts to portray e system where airlines, travelers, end various public sector Institutions, each in pursuit of Its own distinct interests, Interact. How such a system compares with e hgpothetlca| optimum ts s question of great interest, but the Immediate goa| is to better understand the former rather than construct the latter. So far, the effort has focussed on one aspect of this interaction: that between passengers chasing routes and airlines scheduling flights. As the research progresses, we hope to be able to incorporate more of these actors into our analyses, end tn more realistic ways.
Whet follows is an example of how this approach ts being used to develop an understanding of the hubblng phenomenon as related to the networking of international traffic end the competition among International gateweys.~ In Section 2, the background for this application ts presented. Section 3 describes our model. Calibration end validation of the model are discussed In Section 4, while Section 5 describes its application. Finally, In section 6, we summarize our results end discuss the prospects for improving our model. 
F~gure I -Examples of Hubbed Route Systems
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The n-etrport concentret|on ts deftned ss the proportion of en otr||ne's totel/lights whtch ortg|neLe from Its top n e|rports.
Ba©kground
Although deregulation directly affected the U.S. domestic air transport system, its impacts have been felt In the internattonel sector as well. On the one hand, the U.S. government, convinced of the its success on the domestic front, has aggressively pursued ltberaltzaUon of competitive restrictions imposed by bilateral agreements. Of greater relevance here are the impacts that have arisen through the strong inherent linkeges between the domestic end international systems. These exist for two reesons. First, U.S. domestic airlines, In their search for new markets to cultivate, have sought to gain footholds overseas. In addition, relatfvel U few U.S. points can economically support direct service to foreign destinations. A sizable proportion of International trips thus require trove1 on the domestic system.
In light of these circumstances, it is hordly surprising that Increased domestic hubblng has affected patterns of international service. When passengers from many origins are funneled through a single point, that point becomes a likely candidate to receive lnt;ernetional service. Conversely, airlines competing In InternaUonal markets have every incentive to strengthen domestic services to their gateways. In short, the competitive forces unleashed by deregulation have created a situation tn which hubs tend to become international gateweys, and International getaways tend to become hubs. Tables 1 and 2 International gateways in the United States thus face many of the same uncertainties as domestic hubs. Passengers may choose between any of the getaways with direct service to their destination, or may alternatively select connecting service through a European point. Airlines, slmllarlu, have increasing flexibility (though less than tn the domestic context) choosing from which gatewags to offer whet service. The close coupling between domestic end international services amplifies the impact of these choices on airport treffic, and thus on facilltg requirementsand revenue streams at gateway airports.
This research is concerned primarily with looking for o method to incorporate the effects of international hubbing behavior on airport traffic forecasting, in order to do this, we attempt to build a model of traffic distribution among gateways end among airlines. The model represents market response to airline network configurations and gateway strategies.
Airlines compete in the international market on many levels. The most obvious of these is fare competition. However, a review of fares at any point in t|me reveals that carriers typically manage to match each other's fares. They then continue to compete by adjusting their service patterns.
Here they can adjust capacities, service patterns (direct versus connecting) and other aspects such as schedules, aircraft types and so forth. We are concerned here wlth the selection of gateways for international connections, end w|th the provision of domestic feed (connecting) services at these gateways. Passengers with demands between origin and destination city pairs will then respond by selecting carriers and gateways to use for their international journeys. Our model attempts to capture this behavior.
]"he Model
The choice process involved in the problem as defined above is a two-level process and described as follows: a U.S. passenger with an international destination3 has a choice among carriers, and among gateways offering International services. Even for a passenger who originates at a city which is itself e getaway, the option remains, as ls often taken, to fly via another international gateway. There are numerous ways to characterize this choilce process, emong them:
To fix ideas, both our ~_~cusslon and model focus on travel fr~the United States t~Xurope. We ~smne, however, that both v~o~Id appty equally to trays! tn ~e opposite d~ecUoa. 2) Gateway choice conditional on airline choice:
While It Is possible to empirically determine which of these model structures best represents the real world, one can a]so favor one over the others on theoretical or practical grounds. The complexity of the simultaneous choice structure, particularly when the number of option combinations is large, makes It more cumbersome than the nested structures. Of the latter, It would appear that the choice of gateway would In many cases dominate the choice of carrier, especially since the geographic arrangements of these gateways (in the continental U.S.) makes some gateways infeasible for some cities of origin. We have therefore opted, at least as a start, to look st a model with the nested hypothesis, tn which gateway choice occurs first end is followed by airline choice. This means that total demand from eng city in the U.S. is first allocated to a gateway, and then among the carriers serving that gateway.
The general stucture of the model Is shown in Figure 3 . Two gateway share submodels are built. One explains the distribution of traffic originating at a gateway c|ty among available gateways, and the other looks at the choice of gateway for the connecting traffic flows. These are followed by two airline choice submodels. Again one of these looks at the choice by traffic flows that originate and actually travel from a particular gateway city, I.e. nonstop traffic to the European destination. The other looks at the choice by traffic flows connecting at each hub. A more detailed discussion of these models appears in the next section. 
Speclflcetlon end Cellbratlon
The four submodels described In Figure 3 were specified and then calibrated using 1985 (third quarter) origin destination demand data from the U.S. The dote used had numerous deficiencies and It would be outside the scope of this paper to describe them. Suffice it to say that we consider our results rather provts|onal and think that they would certainly benefit from improvements to the data base. Nonetheless, the results obtained appear on the whole to be quite reasonable.
Getaway.Local Share Model
This model predicts the proportion of traffic originating In the local area of a gateway that will use direct service between that gateway and a European point, in general, passengers prefer direct to connecting service, but other considerations (a more convenient departure time, availability of space, lower fores, etc.) will outweigh the advantages of direct service In some cases. The probability of this occurring would be expected to increase, the greater the number of flights from other gateways, and the smaller the number of flights from the local gateway. Furthermore, the probability of using the local getaway ls clearly 0 when that gateway has no flights to the desired destination and | when that getaway has all the flights. Finally, choosing the local gateway would be expected to be more likely the closer the gateway is to Europe, because this would imply a greater circuity disadvantage for alternative gateways. These considerations suggested a model of the form: DI P is the share of trefflc from gateway i to destination J using the local getaway; is the number of non-st~p departures from gateway i to destination j; is the total number of non-stop departures from the U.S. to destinetlon j; ts the distance to London (e proxy for distance to Europe) of gateway i, In thousands of miles; is a parameter to be estimated. p was estimated bg performing ordinary least squares on the logtransformed version of equation (I). The results ere summarized In Table  3 . The flt of the model Is fairly poor, but the hypothesis that p = 0 (which would Imply that ell passengers use direct service when available) can be rejected with e high confidence° The model was also found to sllghtllj outperform ones where SUit Is a fixed constant, end In which the exponent in equation (l) Is a fixed constant rather then a function of distance. Transatlantic passengers who do not use direct service from e local airport--either because none exists or because they prefer some alternative--use connecting service Instead. The gateway connecting share model predicts the shsre of connecting passengers that will fly through a particular gateway. The gateway connecting share model was assumedto be of the 1ogit form. If the alternative gateways to a European destination k are indexed I to n, it is assumed that the proportion of passengers ;using getaway i, Sik, is:
(2)
The Vjk are uttllUes associated with each alternative gateway, one are assumed to be llneer functions of gateway attributes.
The specification of e legit model for the gateway choice problem implies that the relative advantage of e particular gateway in terms of the attributes that constitute the choice function will diminish as the level of service continues to increase. If this model specification is borne out by the empirical evidence, one possible lmplicaUon is that there is e limit to what airlines can do in consolidating flights at a specific gateway In terms of attracting Increasing shares of the market. But it else means that until thls limit Is reached, consol]dotion will be to the airline's, end the passengers', advantage. Of course the extent to which we can verify this empirically depends on the specification of the choice function V(.). A we would expect the choice of e geteweu to depend on e number of factors. One is the capacity offered out of it. In our model we specif U two variables for this, the weekly U.S. flag flights, end the weekly foreign flag flights, from each getaway to each European destination. The distinction between the two is Important since it reflects the fact that with foreign flag carriers interlining is necessary et the getewe U, while the Lt°S. Meg carriers might offer online connection. This of course depends on the carriers" domestic feed, which is the next variable specified in the model. The domestic feed variable is currently speclf|ed in an agoregete way. It is the total number of weekly domestic flights into ~ gateway, by all corriers and from ell U.S. origins, it is later diseggregeted by airline In the eirllne choice submodel. 4
In order to account for the geographic effect of getaway location, since the need to backtrack in order to use e particular gateway is likely to reduce its choice probability, we specified the alr distance to London as a variable to distinguish among gateways. Other potentiallU slgnlficent variables which we Ignore in this specification, but which could be of Importance for gateway choice, include airport congestion end delays, weather conditions, and characteristics of the domestic feed. These omissions reflect limitations In data avaIlebtlltg and resources.
The ~pr|orl specification of the choice function Is then:
where USDjk is the number of weekly U.S. Flag departures between U.$.getewau k and Europe destination k; FDjk is the number of weekly Foreign Flag departures between j end k;
4The existing version of our r nodal does not dlsaggregete b U citu of origin.
This lee serious detrimentwhichwe hope to remove in the near future.
DFj is the domestic feed into getaway j, in thousands of flight per week; is the gateway distance to London, in thousands of miles; g, p, ~, and $ ere parameters to be estimated.
Substituting (3) into (2) and performing some algebra yields:
÷8(Din -Dn)
The coefficients were estimated by performing ordinary least squares on the above equation.
This approach allows some flexibility in constructing the pairwlse comparisons. If traffic is distributed over N alternatives, there are N-I degrees of freedom and thus only N-I of a possible N(N-I) pairs should chosen. In thls analysis, observations were constructed by pairing one airport, hereafter referred to as airport X, with each competitor gateway. This procedure in effect norma|Izes utility resulting from unobserved service attributes so that It Is zero for airport X.
initial results suggested that the model was mlsspecifled with respect to the departure variables. This was indicated, first, by a negative estimate for p, and second, by e negative correlation between the U.S. flag departure variable and the residuals. In addition, the residuals tended to vary systematically with the European destination. The specification was therefore modified to: As explained above, index m in equation 5 always refers to airport X, while index n refers to some competing gotewag.
The calibration results for this model are summarized in Table 4 . The estimated coefficients on the departure, feed, end distance variables all have the expected signs and fairly high signlftcence levels. The London and Paris dummy vsriables ere also statistically significant. We consider the R 2 of 0.76 to be fairly high for this sort of model. The airline local share model predicts airline shares of local trefflc between a gateway and a European destination. Airline local share was expected to depend prirnarIl~I on airline shore of departures. Previous work has suggests that this relationship takes the form of an S-curve, so that airlines with high (low) departure shares have disproportionately high (low) traffic shares. This relationship results from the greeter probability that high-departure-share carriers will offer the most convenient flight sct~edules, and from the resulting tendency for travelers to contact these car'riers first when they make their travel plans.
Data llmltattons, combined with the low Incidence of direct competition in transatlantic markets, precluded a statistically rigorous analysis of this relationship. To be included in the origin-destination sample, an itinerary must have at least one segment on a U.S. airline, so foreign-flag local traffic shares could not be obtained. On the other hand, head=to-head competition between U.S. carriers exists in only a handful of transatlantic markets° The few observations that were available suggested a straightline relationship between departure share and local traffic shore. Such a relationship was therefore assumed in our model.
Airline Connecting Share Model
Thls model, Which predicts airline shares of connecting traffic between a given U.S. gateway and European point, was anticipated to have a specification analogous to the gateway connecting share model. Thus, in selecting an airline between a given gateway and European point, connecting passengers were expected frequencies. Furthermore, air'lineswith stronger feed. therefore a logit function to prefer airlines with higher service these passengers were expected to prefer The ~ specification of the model was in which the utility associated with each alternative airline is a function of the number of departures it offers between the gateway and European point, as well as the number of flights it offers from other U.S. points to the gateway. This rhode1 was estimated using the same palrwtse least squares procedure used for the gateway connecting share model, except that in this case, e specific carrier, airline A, was used as the utility normalizing alternative. The initial results suggested that the strength of the feed effect depended on the identity of the airline, apparently because of network or scheduling differences. The mode| was therefore respecified to allow the feed variable to be airline specific. Because of data limitations, airlinespecific feed var|ables could be estimated for only two airlines, airline A and airline 8. The revised specification Is thus:
where Sijm is ~irline m's share of connecting traffic between U.S. gateway i and European destination j ; DPIj m is the number of weekly departures between U.S. gateway i and European destination j of f erred by airline m; FDim is the domestic feed of airline m into gateway i, in thousands of flights per week; Is a dummy variable equal to I if airline I Is B and 0 otherwise; 4, ~, and S are parameters to be e~timated.
In the date set used for calibratlon, air|Ine m (the airline whose share Is In the numerator of the left hand side of equation 6) is always airline A, end airline n Is always some competing airline.
The calibration results for equation 6 ~re presented In Table 5 . The R 2 indicates a reasonably goad fit, and all coefficients ere statistically significant. Nonetheless, the utility of this submodel is compromised by the restricted scope of the feed variable. In practice, thls means that airline A market shares would be overestimated In situations Involving competition with an airline other then B wlth e strong feed. Figure 4 , predicted and actual total passengers flows from airport X to each of nine European destinations are plotted. Model predictions of the flows are very accurate. In Figure 5 , the predicted and actual connecting traffic flows between airport X and the European destinations are compared. Here, the accuracy is somewhat less. Figure 6 compares predicted and actual passenger flows on airline A between airport X and those destinations (as shown In the figure, A dld not serve ell nine destinations in 1985). The accuracy of this set of predictions Is the lowest of the three. In general, therefore, the model performs well at higher levels of aggregation, Its accuracy diminishing as the flow categories become finer.
ApplicoUons
To conclude our investigation, we used our model system to Investigate the passenger flow impacts of alternative hubbing strategies of airline A. In the real world, an airline's hubbing decisions will be influenced by many factors not included in our model, so this application should be regarded as an exercise rather than an attempt to actually predict the airline's behavior. Nonetheless, the results underscore the sensitivity of passenger flows to specific hubbing strategies, and the consequent need for system planners and policymakers to take them into account.
The application was carried out by defining three alternative hubbing strategies airline A might consider. The strateoles were defined against a third quarter, 1985 baseline, with each specifying a pattern of future operations growth focussed st a particular gateway, in one scenario, the focus was airport X, which in 1985 served as A's major gateway. The other scenarios posited a gradual shift away from airport X as the focus of A's operations, in accordance with observed airline behavior, the shift In the letter scenarios was assumed to take the form of accelerated growth at en alternative gateway rather than a wholesale transfer of operations, it might be motivated by either marketing consideretlons or constraints on facility availability at airport X.
Some of the key results of the analysis of are shown in Figures 7 and 8 . Figure 7 projects the Impact of airline A's strategy choice on total traffic between airport X and the nlne European destinations considered In the model, if airline A focusses its growth st airport X, the traffic increase over 5 years is 40%. On the other hen(I, the Increase is less then 10% if airline A chooses either of the alternative gateways. Figure 8 shows the Implications of the three str~tegles for the performance of airline A, as measured by its passengers per departure to the nine European destinations, if airport A is chosen, passengers per departure Is forecast to lincreose 20% over the five-year period, while 20 and 30 percent declines In 1:his ratio are projected to result from the other strategies. Barring a significant downsizing of elrline A's fleet, this would imply reduced load factors and earnings. Thus, our model system, while admittedly oversimplified, yields unambiguous results in this particular case: airline A's best strategy would be to focus Its growth et airport X, an option which would mean substantial growth in X's international passenger traffic. incidentally, this option is the one A appears to have chosen. 
Conclusions and Directions for Further Research
Competition is contagious. The forces unleashed by deregulation of the U.S. domestic airline Industry have impinged upon both the international air transport and the airport systems° This has resulted in a need to understand how the hubbtng strategies of individual airlines effect both their own competitive performance and airport traffic levels. The model system presented here represents a first attempt at portraying these complex phenomena in a set of empirically estimated structural equations. Despite significant limitations in the scope and level of detail of the models as well as the dote necessary to calibrate them, this initial effort has confirmed the viabilltg of the approach while demonstrating the significance of airline hubbing decisions as determinants of airport traffic and airline performance.
It is clear that our system falls far short of fully capturing the economic forces that drive airline networking behavior. Airlines, airports, and would-be travelers may each be seen as economic entities with distinct objectives. The airlines may be seen as profit:-rnaxtmizers seeking to fill their aircraft with paying customers. Airports might be viewed as growth maximizers subjected to a revenue constraint, or as profiteering monopolists. Passengers are presumably utility maximizers who will choose the service best suited to their individual preferences. In a competitive environment, aiMine networks represent the interactive outcome of decisions by these three sets of actors, as well as the countless others w|th whom these, in turn, interact.
When held up against this standard, the limitations of our work become abundantly clear. Only the choices of passengers are treated explicitly. Analysis of these is limited In the range of choices Included, from which the options of not traveling at all and traveling vie a European gateway are exclucled, and the criteria used to make these choices, which exclucle fare and ortgln-spectffc service variables. The model is weaker still in its treatment of the other actors. Only one airline objective--passengers per departure--is considered, a gross oversimplification. More lrnportantlg, instead of actually predicting airline routing decisions, the model requires that these be entered exogenously. The role of airports, meanwhile, is left entirely out of the picture. Thus, we cannot claim that our models simulate the behavior of a competitive marketplace, but rather only that they model the response of one set of actors In that marketplace to the actions of another.
The next phase of our research is aimed et correcting some of these deflclencies. On the one hand, thls Implies Improving the existing capability to model passenger flows. At e minimum, the steps to be taken in this direction include adding routings via European gateways to the choice set, end disaggregat|ng passengers by origin. Equally important, we Intend to develop some capability to simulate airline responses to passenger flows and to each other. With these enhancements, it is hoped that the model will better capture the competitive realities motivating its development.
